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Chapter24 
THE MAINTENANCE OF 
LAW AND ORDER IN MILITARY 
OPE-RATIONS 
In international military operations States are obliged to cooperate 
in the maintenance oflaw and order. 
1. The phrase 'maintenance of law and order' refers to a broad range of activities. 
In many cases the taking of positive steps to maintain law and order will involve 
responding to the commission of serious crimes against individuals and property, 
the suppression of such crimes, and the development of procedures for dealing 
with such.crime,s. However, the maintenance ofhi.w and order may not necessarily 
involve responding to criminal activity. A military force may, for example, need to 
control a public demonstration or require individuals to be disarmed. Neither of 
these situations may necessarily constitute crimes but may nonetheless be justified 
on the basis of security concerns. It is important to stress that the concept of the 
maintenanceoflaw and order used here covers a broad range of activities. This range 
of activities may include peaceful measures such as the adoption of legislation and 
the development of military doctrine and training programmes extending through 
to operational use of lethal force to prevent serious crimes such as genocide, war 
crimes; and crimes against humanity. These obligations apply to States, interna-
tional ~rganizations and, in some circumstances, to non-State actors. : 
2. Whether specific positive steps to maintain law and order must be taken by forces 
involved in international military operations will depend upon a range of variable 
factors including: the nature of the suspected or actual activity; the source of the 
legal authority to undertake law and order functions; the express or implied func-
tions mandated to the military force; force capability; and relations with the Host 
State or other law and order authorities. Irrespective of obligations to undertake 
specific maintenance oflaw and order functions, all forces involved in international 
military operations are obliged to cooperate in the maintenance of law and order 
responsibiliti~s. Cooperation will often be required between forces involved in joint 
military operations, with forces and/or relevant national authorities of the Host 
State, and also with relevant international organizations, agencies, and bodies. 
3. International legal obligations to cooperate in the maintenance of law and order 
in military operations arise from several sources including peremptory or jus cogens 
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norms, cu~tomary international law, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and Security 
Council resolutions. The precise scope of specific obligations to maintain law and 
order will vary depending upon the source of the obligation. For example, the obliga-
tion to maintain law and order in situations of military occupation is dependent upon 
the authority of the legitimate power passing into the hands of the occupant. In con-
trast, where the Security Council mandates a Force to undertake law and order func-
tions, the fulfilment of those functions will require cooperation with the Host State. 
States parties to the Rome Statute have a treaty obligation to cooperate with the work 
of the International Criminal Court and that particular treaty obligation may well 
have implications for the conduct of military operations. Furthermore, States partici-
pating in joint military operations may take operational decisions to allocate specific 
law and order functions tc; one or more national contingents and other contingents 
will be obliged not to frustrate or obstruct the fulfilment of those functions. 
4. One specific example arising from the deployment of the International Force for 
East Timor (INTERFET) illustrates the significance of cooperation in relation to 
law and order functions. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
issued a Note on Guidance for Multinational Peace-Keeping Force in East Timor on 
Preservation of Evidence.1 The High Commissioner explained that the note was 
based upon a range of sources including 'relevant United Nations standards and 
guidelines, investigation procedures oflnternational Tribunals, and relevant estab-
lished practice' on the investigation of serious crime scenes. In particular, the Note 
explains that even those: 
responsible for investigating alleged human rights violations are generally instructed to 
leave crimes scenes untouched and not to attempt to substitute themselves for the relevant 
national/international authorities. This is particularly important as any action which is not 
professionally conducted may even tamper with criminal investigations and be ultimately 
detrimental to the effective prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations.2 
5. Military forces must plan for, train their personnel for, and devote resources to, 
a range of activities to ensure operational compliance with existing international 
legal obligations. For example, many law and order activities will require military 
forces to cooperate in the preservation of and the gathering of evidence relating to 
serious crimes such as genocide as well as in the development of procedures to deal 
with detainees. 
All States are obliged to repress, and to provide penal sanctions for 
persons committing or ordering to be committed, serious crimes 
under international law . 
. , 
1 For the text of the Note see Australian Defence Force Military Law Centre, Law and Military 
Operations in East Timor September 1999-February 2000 (Canberra: Australian Defence Force, 2002), 
Annex L. See also M.J. Kelly, T.L.H. McCormack, P. Muggleton, and B.M. Oswald, 'Legal aspects of 
Australia's involvement in the International Force for East Timor', 841 IRRC (2001), 101-139. 
2 Ibid. 3. 
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I. There are a range of serious international crimes regulated by various interna- 24.02 
tional legal regimes. These crimes include war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, torture, piracy, and human trafficking. Maintenance of law and order 
obligations in relation to these crimes accrue pursuant to treaties, customary inter-
national law, Security Council resolutions, and the statutes and jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals. 
2. In relation to war crimes, the relevant legal regime has traditionally distinguished 
between 'grave breaches' of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 and other serious violations of the laws and customs of war. In 
relation to the grave breaches regime, all States parties to the 1949 Conventions and 
all States parties to Additional Protocol I have two key obligations: to enact penal 
sanctions for those found guilty of grave breaches; and to proactively investigate 
those allegedly responsible for grave breaches and either extradite or prosecute such 
accused. The Four Geneva Conventions (GC) require States parties to undertake 
these measures to repress grave breaches3 and impose an additional obligation 'for· 
the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the ... Convention'.4 Article 
85 of Additional Protocol I (API) states that '[t]he provisions of the Conventions 
relating to t~e repression of breaches and grave breaches ... shall apply to the repres-
sion of breaches and grave breaches of this Protocol'. It provides a supplemented 
list of grave breaches and confirms that all grave breaches shall be regarded as war 
crimes.5 
3. In the English language, the meanings of'repress' and 'suppress' are synonym-
ous. The text of the Conventions and Additional Protocol I does not explicitly make 
any distinction between the two terms. In the First Geneva Convention the words 
'Repression of Abuses and Infractions' are used as headline for Articles 49-54 
which, inter alia, comprise the criminal prosecution of grave breaches and the 
'suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other 
than grave breaches'. According to the ICRC Commentary, '[g]rave breaches must 
be repressed, which implies the obligation to enact legislation laying down effect-
ive penal sanctions for perpetrators of such breaches'.6 The Commentary also 
states that: 
[f]or breaches of the Protocol other than grave breaches the terms are the same as those 
used by the Conventions: ... the Parties to the Protocol undertake to suppress them, which 
means that any 'repression' that might be undertaken by penal or disciplinary sanctions are 
3 Art. 49 (2) GC I; Art. 50 (2) GC II; Art. 129 (2) GC III; Art. 146 (2) GC IV; Art. 85 (1) API. 
4 Art. 49 (3) GC I; Art. 50 (3) GC II; Art. 129 (3) GC III; Art. 146 (3) GC IV; Art. 85 (1) API. 
5 For a detailed discussion about the grave breaches- regime see Y. Sandoz, J.-M. Henckaerts, 
K. Dormann, R. GeiB, W. Fernandusse, K. Roberts, L. Moir, C. KreB, R. O'Keefe, D. Fleck, and 
J. G. Stewart in 'Special Issue: The Grave Breaches Regime in the Geneva Conventions: A Reassessment 
Sixty Years On~ 7 journal of International Criminal justice (2009), 653-877. 
6 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 
8 june 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1987), para. 3538. 
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24.02 the responsibility of the authority on which those committing such breaches depend or the 
Power to which they belong? 
4. In this discussion the Commentary focuses upon the prosecution of grave and 
other breaches of Additional Protocol I and not on any intended distinction between 
the two terms. However, the drafters ofboth the Conventions and the Protocol must 
have intended some distinction between the two terms since all five of these treaties 
suggest that the obligation in relation to grave breaches differs from the obligation in 
relation to all other breaches. The Commentary clearly adopts a view that 'repression' 
relates to ultimate penal sanctions. Perhaps then 'suppression' was intended to mean 
measures to stop the ongoing occurrence of the breaches. If this distinction is correct, 
then 'repression' could also incorporate 'suppression' but not vice versa. 
5. Assuming that the suggested distinction is correct, there are important main-
tenance oflaw and order implications for military forces. In circumstances where 
a party to an international armed conflict fails to act to prevent violations ofinter-
national humanitarian law when it has a duty to do so, forces should take measures 
to stop those violations of international humanitarian law. Military forces should 
not ignore breaches of international humanitarian law and should cooperate to 
report and where possible investigate and prevent ongoing breaches. The ability 
of military forces to report, investigate, and prevent ongoing breaches will depend 
on a variety of factors including the resources available to them and their level of 
training. At the very least, commanders should ensure that their personnel have 
the appropriate resources and training to report violations ofinternational human-
itarian law. 
6. In this context military forces must also recognize that they will often be 
required to cooperate with other organizations such as the International Criminal 
Court, international humanitarian organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and national law and order organizations to repress and suppress 
grave breaches of international humanitarian law by reporting and investigating 
allegations of such breaches. UN peacekeepers serving with the United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for example, were 
mandated to 'cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious 
violations of ... international humanitarian law are brought to justice, while 
working closely with the relevant agencies of the United Nations'.8 One mecha-
nism that would be useful for military forces to utilize in circumstances where 
they know they must cooperate with other organizations in repressing and sup-
pressing grave breaches of international humanitarian law is to develop a memo-
randum of understanding or agreement with those organizations so as to ensure 
that the appropriate modalities for reporting, investigating, and preventing grave 
breaches are implemented. Such an agreement was entered into in Timor Leste, 
7 Ibid. 3539. 8 SC Res. 1565 (1 October 2004), para. 5 (g). 
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for example, between INTERFET and the Office of the High Commissioner for 24.02 
Human Rights.9 
7. In relation to war crimes, a term which goes beyond that of grave breaches of 
either the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I in that it comprises all ser-
ious violations of international humanitarian law, all States have a right to vest uni-
versal jurisdiction in their domestic criminal courts. The ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law recognizes the existence of this right10 which is 
consistent with the statutes and jurisprudence ofinternational and domestic crim-
inal courts and tribunals.U 
8. Pursuant to Article 89 of Additional Protocol I States parties are obliged jointly 
or individually to cooperate with the United Nations in accordance with their obli-
gations under the UN Charter, in situations of serious violations (including grave 
breaches) of the Protocol or of the four Geneva Conventions. 
9. There are a number of other international crimes codified in specific treaty 
regimes the proscription of which has been widely recognized as having attained 
peremptory status, i.e. as norms of international law from which no derogation is 
permitted. These crimes have also been widely recognized as obligations owed erga 
omnes: 
that is, obligations owed towards all the other members of the international community, 
each of which then has a correlative right. In addition, the violation of such an obligation 
simultaneously constitutes a breach of the correlative right of all members of the interna-
tional community and gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing to each and every mem-
ber, which then ha~ the right to insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call for 
the breach to be discontinuedP 
10. The peremptory status and the erga omnes character of these crimes has been 
affirmed by the International Court of] ustice, various international criminal courts 
and tribunals, and by the International Law Commission. The crimes in this cat-
egory include, inter alia, genocide, torture, and piracy. In the context of the mainte-
nance oflaw and order, military forces should take all reasonably available measures 
to prevent such crimes from occurring and to monitor, report, investigate, and to 
assist in the prosecution of those responsible where such crimes have occurred. 
9 Australian Defence Force Military Law Centre, above n. 1, Annex L. 
10 
.J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Rule 157 on 'War Crimes'. 
11 Id. Vol. I, 604-607, referring to the legislation of Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Niger, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, and 
United States, and to draft legislation of Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and Tobago. See also Art. 
8 (2) (b) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) of 17 July 1998, and the 
implementation of that provision by various States parties into their domestic criminal law . 
12 ICTY,ProsecutorvFurundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial ChamberJudgmentoflO December 
1998, para. 151. 
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24.02 11. Genocide. The customary international law prohibition of genocide was first 
codified in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide in 1948. That treaty definition has been replicated in the statutes of all 
international criminal courts and tribunals since-including in the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court. Article 1 of the Genocide Convention obli-
gates States parties in time of peace or in war to prevent and punish acts of genocide. 
The International Court of Justice has characterized the prohibition on genocide as 
'assuredly' a peremptory norm ofinternationallaw (jus cogens)13 and also as an obli-
gation owed erga omnes.14 The Court has specifically considered the extent of the 
obligation in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention and found: 
that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a 
State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing 
the commission of genocide: the obligation of States Parties is rather to employ all means 
reasonably available to them so as to prevent genocide so far as possible ... responsibility 
is, however, incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide 
which were in its power, and which might have contributed to preventing genocide.15 
12. Torture. The customary international law prohibition of torture is located in a 
range ofinternational treaties including the Geneva Conventions, the Convention 
Against Torture, and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. In 
the context of the maintenance of law and order on military operations the 1984 
Convention Against Torture requires that States parties 'shall take effective legis-
lative, administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction'.16 Torture may never be justified in any circum-
stances including on the basis of conflict, internal political stability, or other public 
emergencyP Furthermore States parties are prohibited from expelling, returning, 
or extraditing a person 'to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger ofbeing subjected to torture'.18 In its judgment 
in the Furundzija case the Trial Chamber of the ICTY found that: 
it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the 
international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are pre-
sent in a territory under its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to 
prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered treaty-making power 
13 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Rwanda), Judgment on jurisdiction of3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, 6, 32, para. 
64. 
14 ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5 
February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 34. 
15 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 
1, 154. 
16 Art. 2 (1) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 10 December 1984. 17 Art. 2 (2) Convention against Torture. 
18 Art. 3 (1) Convent,ion against Torture. 
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of sovereign States, and on the other hand bar States from prosecuting and punishing those 24.02 
torturers who have engaged in this odious practice abroad. This legal basis for States' univer-
sal jurisdiction over torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for such jurisdic-
tion found by other courts in the inherently universal character of the crime. It has been held 
that international crimes being universally condemned wherever they occur, every State has 
the right to prosecute and punish the authors of such crimes.19 
13. Piracy. The customary international law prohibition on piracy is codified in 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. Article 100 of the Convention 
requires that States 'shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression 
of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State'. 
The Security Council in its Resolution 1816 (2008) reaffirmed that such repression 
included but was not limited 'to boarding, searching, and seizing vessels engaged 
in or suspected of engaging in acts of piracy, and to apprehend persons engaged in 
such acts with a view to such persons being prosecuted'.20 The repression of piracy 
also extends to the sharing of information about 'acts of piracy and armed rob-
bery ... and to render assistance to vessels threatened by or under attack by pirates or 
armed robbers in accordance with relevant internationallaw'.21 The International 
Law Commission has reaffirmed the jus cogens character of this prohibition.22 One 
recent example of precisely this kind oflaw and order function in relation to piracy 
has arisen in the context of the EU NAVFOR Somalia-Operation ATALANTA 
which is directed against piracy off the Somali Coast and is undertaken in fulfilment 
of the UN Security Council resolutions. According to the EU, military personnel 
involved in the operation can arrest, detain, and transfer persons who are suspected 
of having committed or who have committed acts of piracy or armed robbery in the 
areas they are present. They can seize the vessels of the pirates or the vessels captured 
following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the 
pirates, as well as the goods on board. The suspects can be prosecuted, as appropri-
ate, by an EU Member State or by Kenya under the agreement signed with the EU 
on 6 March 2009 giving the Kenyan authorities to right to prosecute.23 
14. Slavery. The customary international law prohibition of slavery was first codi-
fied in the Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of 25 September 
1926. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention States parties are obligated, in respect 
of the territories placed under their 'sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty 
or tutelage' to prevent and suppress the slave trade and to bring about, progressively 
and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms. In addition, 
pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention, States parties are obliged to 'give to one 
19 Furundzija]udgment, above (n. 12), para. 156. 
20 SC Res. 1816 (2 June 2008), para. 1, on the situation in Somalia. 21 Ibid. 3. 
22 See Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising/rom the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN 
GAOR, 58th sess, UN DocA/CN.4/L.682 (2006), 166-205. 
23 European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, EU Naval Operation Against Piracy 
(EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA) (2009), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cmsUpload/090325FactsheetEUNAVFORo/o20Somalia-version4_EN.pdf>. 
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24.02 another every assistance with the object of securing the abolition of slavery and the 
slave trade'. 
15. Transnational Crime and Human Trafficking. The United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Crime has been developed to 'promote cooperation to pre-
vent and combat transnational organised crime more effectively'.24 Pursuant to 
Article 3 the Convention applies to the prevention, investigation, and prosecution 
of serious crimes,25 participation in an organized criminal group,26 laundering of 
proceeds of crime,27 and corruption28 where 'the offence is transnational in nature 
and involves an organized criminal group'. The Convention also includes a Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children.29 The Protocol includes measures to 'prevent such trafficking, to punish 
the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by protecting 
their internationally recognised human rights'.30 A further purpose of the Protocol 
is to 'promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet' the objectives of 
the Protocol.31 Both the Convention and the Protocol impose maintenance oflaw 
and order obligations in circumstances where military forces are confronted with 
organized criminal groups involved in the proscribed crimes. A recent example of 
military forces being authorized to deal with transnational crimes in cooperation 
with national authorities involved NATO's announcement of the ISAF's increased 
role in countering the illegal narcotics trade in Afghanistan.32 
16. Other maintenance oflaw and order obligations include the exchange of infor-
mation aimed at identifying perpetrators and victims of the proscribed crimes,33 
and to strengthen border controls to detect and to prevent human trafficking.34 
In relation to identified victims of proscribed crimes, military forces are required 
to take appropriate measures within their means 'to provide assistance and pro-
~ tection ... in particular in cases of threat of retaliation or intimidation'.35 States 
may have additional treaty obligations pursuant to relevant regional or bilateral 
treaties and agreements requiring them to cooperate in responding to particular 
criminal activities including in the context of military operations. One example 
24 Art. 1 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November 
2000, 2225 UNTS 209. 25 For definition see Art. 2 (b) of the Convention. 
26 For a description of participation in an organized criminal group, see Art. 5 of the Convention. 
27 For a description oflaundering the proceeds of crime, see Art 6. of the Convention. 
28 For the criminalization of corruption, see Art 8. of the Convention. 
29 UNGARes. 55/25, UN GAOR, fifty-fifth Session, 62nd plenary meeting, Annex II {Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Expecially Women and Children), Agenda Item 
105, preamble, UN DocA/RES/55/25 (8 January 2001) ('Trafficking Protocol'). 30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. Art. 2 {c). 
32 See e.g. the announcement by NATO in October 2008: NATO, NATO steps up counter-narcotics 
efforts in Afghanistan (2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/1 0-october/el 01 Ob.htmb. 
33 See generally Arts. 5-9 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 
15 November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209. 34 Art. 11 of the Trafficking Protocol (above, n. 29). 
35 Art. 25 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November 
2000. 
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is the Council of Europe's Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human 
Beings.36 
17. When engaged in operations where international crimes are alleged to have 
been committed, or are being committed, military commanders need to consider 
what specific powers they will authorize military personnel to exercise in relation 
to such crimes. For example, the commanders of European naval forces taking part 
in Operation ATALANTA to protect vessels from piracy and armed robbery in 
the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali Coast are authorized to 'employ the necessary 
measures, including the use of force to deter, prevent and intervene, in order to 
bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the 
areas where they are present'.37 
18. The ability of military forces to repress and suppress international crimes by 
means such as reporting on and investigation of the crimes, will depend on a var-
iety of factors including the resources available to them and their level of train-
ing. At the very least, commanders should ensure that their personnel have the 
appropriate training to enable them to report such crimes. Effective training would 
ensure knowledge of the core elements of each category of serious international 
crime. Where military personnel are required to work with, or liaise with, other law 
enforcement organizations engaged in the prevention of such crimes, it is important 
that they develop appropriate mechanisms to ensure that the handling and treat-
ment of international criminals are dealt with in accordance with the law pursuant 
to which the accused is likely to be dealt with. Such mechanisms might include the 
implementation of a memorandum of understanding to deal with such matters as 
handing physical custody of the accused, and any evidence relating to the alleged 
crime, over to the law enforcement organization. Thus, in relation to dealing with 
those accused of conducting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Governments of the 
United Kingdom and Kenya have entered into a memorandum of understanding 
which defines the 'modalities for transferring suspects held for conducting acts of 
piracy ... from the custody of UK forces to Kenyan authorities'.38 
All parties to an armed conflict are obliged to respect and ensure 
respect for international humanitarian law. 
1. Common Article 1 to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Article 1 (1) of 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, and Article 4 of the 
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict impose treaty obligations on States parties to respect and ensure respect 
for the respective treaty regimes. The scope of application of Common Article 1 
36 Coun~il ofEurope Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings ofl6 May 2005, 
OJ No L 197. 37 Operation ATALANTA, above (n. 23). See also Chapter 20 above. 
38 See Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Report, Kenya and the United Kingdom Sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Piracy Along the Coast ofSomalia, <http:/ /www.mfa.go.ke/mfacms/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=305&Itemid=62>. 
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24.03 extends also to respecting and ensuring respect for Common Article 3 in the con-
text of non-international armed conflicts. The same obligation derives from Article 
18 of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and Article 1 
of the Second Protocol to that Convention, adopted on 26 May 1999. 
2. According to the Internatimial Committee of the Red Cross, the obligation 
to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law has also become 
a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflict and is not dependent upon reciprocity.39 In addition to 
the evidence proffered by the ICRC in support of its rules, the obligation to respect 
and to ensure respect for international humanitarian law was reaffirmed during the 
30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 
Geneva in 2007. The conference resolved that all States and parties to armed con-
flicts are obliged to 'respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law 
in all circumstances'. The conference also stressed that all States have an obligation 
'to refrain from encouraging violations of international humanitarian law by any 
party to an armed conflict and to exert their influence, to the degree possible, to 
prevent and end violations, either individually or through multilateral mechanisms, 
in accordance with internationallaw'.40 
3. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case also recognized the general obligation articulated 
in Common Article I to the Geneva Conventions as reflective of a rule of customary 
international law. The Court stated that: 
there is an obligation on States in terms ofCommonArticle 1 to the Four Geneva Conventions 
'to respect' the Conventions and even to 'ensure respect' for them 'in all circumstances', 
since such an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but from 
the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific 
expression.41 
4. In delivering judgment in the Kuprefkic case, the Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found that the 
obligation in Common Article 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions was an obligation 
owed erga omnes and not subject to reciprocity.42 The Trial Chamber cited the: 
International Court of]ustice in the Barcelona Traction case (which specifically referred to 
obligations concerning fundamental human rights)-they lay down obligations towards 
the international community as a whole, with the consequence that each and every member 
39 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (above, n. 10), Rules 139, 140. 
40 ICRC, 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Geneva 26-30 
November 2007 (2007), <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/p1108/$File/ 
ICRC_002_1108.PDF>. 
41 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), Judgment of 
27 June 1986 (Merits), ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 114. 
42 ICTY,Prosecutor v Zoran KupreJkic eta!., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment of 4 
January 2000. , 
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of the international community has a 'legal interest' in their observance and consequently a 24.03 
legal entitlement to demand respect for such obligations.43 
5. States are required to maint'ain law and order in the context of military operations 
consistently with this legal obligation. States must, therefore, take the necessary 
steps to ensure that th~ development of doctrine, training regimes, directives and 
other forms of guidance, standard operating procedures, and enforcement mecha-
nisms are effectively implemented so that military commanders and their subordi-
nates are fully aware of the obligation to respect international humanitarian law. 
6. Whereas Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and also Article 1(1) 
of Additional Protocol I couch the obligation in general terms, some other treaty 
regimes are more explicit about the range of activities military forces may engage in 
to respect and ensure respect for the particular treaty regime. For example, Article 4 
(3) of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property obliges States 
parties to 'prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pil-
lage, or misappropriation of, an~ any acts of vandalism against, cultural property'. 
This Article includes an indicative list of the sorts of activities which may need to 
be undertaken by military forces to ensure their own respect for the protection of 
cultural property. 
7. In relation to respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian 
law in the context of non-international armed conflicts, the principal treaty obliga-
tion is Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions which provides a set of 
minimum standards of protection that all parties to a non-international armed con-
flict are expected to observe. These minimum standards of protection include the 
prohibitions against murder, torture, hostage taking, and outrages upon personal 
dignity.44 These protections apply without adverse discrimination based upon, 
for example, race, sex, or religion.45 Specifically, for example, in situations where 
military forces take detainees in non-international armed conflicts parties to the 
conflict are obliged to treat those detainees humanely and in accordance with the 
minimum standards of protection. There is an 'obligation to treat all persons in the 
power of a party ... including persons deprived of their liberty' in accordance with 
the minimum standards. One effect of Common Article 3 is to ensure that when 
undertaking maintenance oflaw and order functions no person is outside the pro-
tections afforded by law.46 
8. Common Article 3 is recognized as reflective of a customary international law 
rule binding on all parties to a non-international armed conflict. Participants in 
the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
43 Ibid. para. 519.For further discussion concerning the doctrine of obligations owed erga omnes see 
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
44 Art. 3 common to GC I-IV. 45 Ibid. 
46 ICRC, International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Geneva 26-30 November 
2007 (above, n. 40), Resolution 3 (para. 3). 
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in Geneva in 2007 J.;eaffirmed the binding nature of these minimum standards 
of protection.47 The resolution from participating States at the 30th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in Geneva in 2007 that 
all States and parties to armed conflicts are obliged to 'respect and ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law in all circumstances' clearly demonstrates that the 
scope of the customary rule in non-international armed conflict extends beyond the 
minimum standards of protection in Common Article 3. 
9. As affirmed by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement military command-
ers must 'refrain from encouraging violations ofinternational humanitarian law by 
any party to an armed conflict and to exert their influence, to the degree possible, to 
prevent and end violations, either individually or through multilateral mechanisms, 
in accordance with internationallaw'.48 Here the obligation to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflict is consistent 
with that to repress and suppress serious international crimes (outlined above). At 
the very least, commanders should ensure that their personnel have the appropriate 
training to enable them to report violations of the law and to have standard operat-
ing procedures to deal with any observation of such violations. 
10. The obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law is not an 
absolute obligation. As participants in the 30th International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement affirmed, military commanders must 
'refrain from encouraging violations of international humanitarian law by any 
party to an armed conflict and to exert their influence, to the degree possible, to 
prevent and end violations, either individually or through multilateral mechanisms, 
in accordance with internationallaw'.49 Here the obligation 'to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law' is surely consistent with that to repress and sup-
press serious international crimes (outlined above). At the very least, commanders 
should ensure that their personnel have the appropriate training to enable them to 
report violations of the law and to have standard operating procedures to deal with 
any observation of such violations. 
11. It is worth noting that any action taken to respect and to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law 'should be in conformity with the Charter and 
international law'.5° Consequently, consistent with general principles of inter-
national humanitarian law such as military necessity and humanity, any use of 
military force to 'ensure respect' for the various treaty regimes should only be a last 
resort unless the circumstances are such that no other option is available. 
In situations of military occupation the occupant is obliged to take 
all measures within its power to restore, and as far as possible ensure, 
47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. paras. 1-2. 49 Ibid. 
50 See e.g. ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion of9 July 2004), ICJ Reports 2004, 136, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 
39. 
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public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely pre- 24.04 
vented, the laws in force in the occupied country. 
1. A specific obligation to restore and to maintain law and order in occupied terri-
tory arises pursuant to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.51 As the: 
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, 
the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, 
public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in 
the country.52 
This specific obligation would extend to the occupying force preventing such activi-
ties as rioting, unlawful killing, violence against persons including sexual violence, 
looting, arson, etc. 
2. The International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (2005) determined that the obligations arising under Article 
43 of the Hague Regulations are binding on Occupying Powers as rules of custom-
ary international law. In that case, the Congo argued that Uganda had violated 
various international legal obligations as a result of the activities ofits armed forces 
on Congolese territory. Specifically the Court considered that the Uganda Peoples' 
Defence Forces (UPDF) 'took no action to prevent such [ethnic] conflicts in Ituri 
districts'.53 The Court also relied upon findings presented to the Security Council 
that 'Ugandan Army commanders already present in Ituri, instead of trying to calm 
the situation, preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternatively one 
side or the other according to their political and financial interests' and that 'UPDF 
troops stood by during the killings and failed to protect the civilians'.54 
3. The obligation in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations was further developed 
~y Geneva Convention IV of 1949 which provides in relevant part that the main-
tenance of law and order may include subjecting the population of the occupied 
territory: 
to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations ... to 
maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying · 
Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise 
of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. 55 
This provision acknowledges the entitlement of the Force to guarantee its own 
security as a fundamental prerequisite to the Force's own ability to maintain law 
and order. Likewise the Israeli High Court of] ustice in Beit Sourik Village Council v 
51 Hague Regulations (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 
Convention, Regulation respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land of 18 October 1907. 
52 Art. 43 HagueReg. 
53 ICJ,ArmedActivities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), 
Judgment of19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, 168, 241. 54 Ibid. 
55 Art. 64 GC IV. 
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24.04 The Government of Israel and the Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (2004) 
stated that: 
the law of belligerent occupation recognizes the authority of the military commander to 
maintain security in the area and to protect the security of his country and her citizens. 
However, it imposes conditions on the use of this authority. This authority must be properly 
balanced against the rights, needs and interests of the local population.56 
4. One particular example of the balance between the security needs of the occupy-
ing forces and the rights, needs, and interests of the local population arises in the 
requirements for dealing with those suspected of activities hostile to the security of 
the occupier. Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV stipulates that such persons shall 
be treated humanely and 'in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair 
and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention'. A further guarantee of the 
rights of 'protected persons' is provided for in Article 70 of Geneva Convention IV 
which prohibits the Occupying Power from arresting, prosecuting, or convicting 
such persons 'for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, 
or during a temporary interruption thereo£ with the exception of breaches of the 
laws and customs of war'. 
5. In relation to the humane treatment of protected persons, Occupying Powers 
are obliged to ensure that such persons are protected 'against all acts of violence or 
threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity'. Women 'shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honour in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form ofindecent assault'. The obligations on Occupying Powers 
to treat protected persons humanely, therefore, require commanders to ensure that 
they uphold the highest standards of discipline on their own troops and train their 
personnel on the obligation of humane treatment. Concerning the obligation to 
protect individuals from all acts of violence or threats thereo£ commanders should 
plan for the creation of zones of protection including non-defended localities and 
demilitarized zones.57 Other strategies for the protection ofindividuals may include 
the establishment of curfews and the implementation of security patrols where law 
and order is threatened or has broken down. 
6. In maintaining law and order in situations of military occupation, there is a 
general prohibition on amending the penal laws of the occupied territory.58 This 
general prohibition is limited to circumstances where the penal law of the occupied 
territory 'constitutes a threat to its [the Occupying Power's] security or an obsta-
cle to the application of the present Convention'. The requirement to respect local 
laws is qualified not only by the security needs of the Occupying Power but also 
where local laws are at variance with established international human rights law 
56 Isr Supreme Court, Beit Sourik village Council v The Government of Israel and the Commander of 
IDF Forces in the West Bank ('separation fence in the area of judea and Samaria'), 2004 HCJ 2056/04, 
Judgment of30 June 2004, para. 34. 57 Arts. 59 and 60 GC IV. 
58 Art. 64 GC IV. 
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standards. The approach that maximizes the protection of the occupied population 
should be given priority. · 
7. By implication, pursuant to Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV occupying 
forces may need to engage in the maintenance of law and order to comply with the 
requirement to 'take such measures of control and security in regard to protected 
persons as may be necessary'.59 This requirement may include assigning residence or 
interning protected persons 'for imperative reasons of security'.60 
8. There is also an obligation that occupying military forces 'shall as far as possible 
support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding 
and preserving its cultural property'.61 Military forces are required to 'prohibit, pre-
vent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation 
of, and any acts of vandalism against, cultural property'.62 
9. The law of occupation, therefore, has a considerable impact on planning and 
conducting maintenance oflaw and order aspects of military operations. For exam-
ple, commanders will need to consider the extent to which rules of engagement will 
need to authorize the use of force in dealing with various levels of criminals such as 
looters and those carrying out petty theft. Commanders will also need to identify 
how best to train their subordinates to understand the legal system of the occupied 
territory so that people are not detained arbitrarily or unlawfully. In relation to tak-
ing and dealing with internees, commanders will also need to ensure that adequate 
resources are devoted to accommodating any internees that might be detained for 
imperative reasons of security. 
10. Even in situations where the law of occupation does not apply de jure, it may 
nonetheless be a useful body of law to use by analogy when maintaining law and 
order because its rules and principles provide useful guidance for military forces 
dealing with the civilian population when law and order has broken down. The 
International Force in Timor Leste, for example, used the law of occupation to 
establish its interim justice system.63 The Law ofMilitary Occupation did not apply 
to that particular operation because Indonesia had consented to the deployment of 
INTERFET. 
Where military operations are conducted pursuant to Security 
Council authorization and the Security Council mandate specifies a 
maintenance oflawand order obligation, the military force is obliged 
to implement the mandate and to act consistently with it. 
59
· Art. 27 (4) GC IV. 60 Art. 78 GC IV. 
61 Art. 5 (1) Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict of14 May 1954. 
62 Art. 4 (3) Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict. 
63 For further detail see B.M. Oswald, 'The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East 
Timor' 3 YIHL (2002), 347-361. 
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24.05 1. Article 25 (I) of the UN Charter requires Member States of the UN to carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council. Consequently, whenever the Council man-
dates the maintenance of law and order on peace operations, contributing States 
should use all means reasonably available to them to maintain law and order so far 
as is possible to implement the mandate. Sometimes the mandate is specific. In its 
authorization of the deployment ofiNTERFET to East Timor in 1999, for exam-
ple, the Council mandated the Force 'to restore peace and security in East Timor, 
to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capa-
bilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations', and authorizes the States 
participating in the multinational force 'to take all necessary measures to fulfil this 
mandate'.64 
2. On other occasions the Council mandates the Force to cooperate with national 
authorities in the maintenance of law and order. For example, in Resolution 1794 
the Council tasked MONUC to cooperate with Congolese authorities to bring 
'those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humani-
tarian law ... to justice'.65 
3. There are also other circumstances in which the Council authorizes peace opera-
tions to undertake a range of functions which, by implication, require the mainte-
nance of law and order by peacekeepers. For example, the Council has mandated 
forces to 'protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence'66 and to 
'provide security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at 
risk'.67 The Security Council has also encouraged multinational forces to assist local 
authorities to deal with specific crimes such as drug trafficking. The International 
Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for example, has been encouraged to 'effec-
tively support, within its designated responsibilities, Afghan-led sustained efforts 
to address, in cooperation with relevant international and regional actors, the threat 
posed by the illicit production, of and trafficking in drugs'.68 
4. In such circumstances, military personnel should take all reasonable measures 
to fulfil their law and order functions. Such measures might include intelligence 
sharing and the conduct of efficient public information campaigns, training local 
authorities and providing resources to them to ensure that they are capable of deal-
ing with law and order matters in accordance with generally accepted international 
standards, developing appropriate rules of engagement and directives so as to ensure 
that members of the military force know the extent of their law and order powers 
when dealing with the nationals of the Host State, and having sufficient resources 
to deal with any persons taken into custody. 
64 SC Res. 1264 (15 September 1999); para. 3. 
65 SC Res. 1794 {21 December 2007), para. 16. 66 Ibid. para. 8. 
67 SC Res. 918 (17 May 1994), para. 3 {a), on the expansion of the mandate of the UN Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda and imposition of an arms embargo on Rwanda. 
68 SC Res. 1833 (22 September 2008), Preamble. 
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5. From time to time the Security Council adopts thematic resolutions which 24.05 
impact upon the maintenance of law and order during military operations. For 
example, in Resolution 1888 (2009) dealing with Women, Peace and Security the 
Security Council demanded: 
that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, 
including women and children, from all forms of sexual violence, including measures such 
as, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the prin-
ciple of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms 
of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence and vetting 
candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of those associ-
ated with serious violations ofinternational humanitarian and human rights law, including 
sexual violence.69 
This particular provision creates maintenance oflaw and order obligations on mili-
tary forces to take steps including disciplinary measures and training. In addition, 
where military forces are responsible for training national armies and security forces 
there is a requirement to ensure vetting of prospective personnel to exclude those 
associated with serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
6. In military operations established not by a Security Council resolution but pur-
suant to bilateral or multilateral agreements, obligations for the maintenance of 
law and order can be mandated specifically and by implication. The Agreement 
between the Solomon Islands and various Pacific Forum contributing nations to 
the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMS!) specifies, for 
example, the following: 
The Assisting Countries may deploy a visiting Contingent of police forces, armed forces and 
other personnel to Solomon Islands to assist in the provision of security and safety to per-
sons and property; maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the Solomon Islands 
community; prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime; support and develop 
Solomon Islands institutions; and generally to assist in the maintenance oflaw and order in 
Solomon Islands ... Members of the Participating Armed Forces and Participating Police 
Force and other members of the visiting Contingent appointed to the Solomon Islands 
Police Force may detain and disarm any person or persons who are committing or attempt-
ing to commit offences in relation to person or property?0 
7. One example of assistance in the maintenance oflaw and order arose by impli-
cation from the Dayton Accord. The Commander of the multinational military 
Implementation Force (IFOR) was authorized to undertake all that was 'neces-
sary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect IFOR and to carry 
69 SC Res. 1888 (30 September 2009), para. 3. See below, Chapter 28 'Prevention and Repression 
of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Context of Peace Operations'. 
70 Arts. 2 and 6 Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa and Tonga concerning the operation and status of the police and armed forces and 
other personnel deployed to Solomon Islands to assist in the restoration of law and order and security 
of30 June 2003 (2003 Australian Treaty Series 17) . 
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out responsibilities' and this mandate was interpreted to include the disarming of 
individuals carrying military weapons within the agreed Zone of Separation.71 
In military operations there is an obligation to take all feasible meas-
ures to ensure that children under 15 years of age do not take a direct 
part in hostilities. 
1. Article 77 (2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 obligates all States parties to. 
undertake all feasible measures to ensure that children under the age of 15 years 
do not take a direct part in armed hostilities. The obligation includes a prohibi-
tion on the recruitment of such children into the armed forces of States parties. 
Article 8 (2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reinforces 
the prohibition in Article 77 (2) of AP I by including the war crime of 'conscript-
ing or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into the national armed forces or 
using them to participate in hostilities' in either international or non-international 
armed conflicts?2 The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child raises the age limit for 
the prohibition on the involvement of children from 15 years to 18 years. While 
the 15-year age limitation is accepted as a norm of customary international law 
(according to the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study)73 the 
same cannot be said for the increased age limit of 18 years. At best, it may be argued 
that the Optional Protocol represents de lege ferenda on this question of age. One 
consequence of the Optional Protocol is that armed groups 'that are distinct from 
the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in 
hostilities persons under the age of 18 years'?4 1his prohibition requires States par-
ties to 'take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the 
adoption oflegal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalise such practice'?5 
2. The obligation not to involve children under the age of 15 years in hostilities 
extends to recruitment, conscription, and use of such child soldiers76 In the case 
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone against the co-accused Sesay, Kallen, and 
Gbao, the court reaffirmed that: 
the offence of recruitment of child soldiers by way of conscripting or enlisting children 
under the age of 15 years into an armed force or group and/or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities constitutes a crime under customary international law which entailed 
individual criminal responsibility prior to the time frame of the IndictmentP 
71 Art. 6 (5) and Art. 4 (2) General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 
14 December 1995 (35 ILM(1996), 89. 72 Arts. 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and 8 (2) (e) (vii) ICC Statute. 
73 See CIHL, above (n. 10), Rule 136. 
74 Art. 4 (1) Optional Protocol to Convention on the Rights of the Child of20 November 1989. 
75 Art. 4 (2) Optional Protocol to Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
76 See ICC, Arrest Warrant of 10 February 2006 (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I) ICC-01/04-01/06. . 
77 Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
(Trial Chamber) Case No. SCSL-04-15-T (8 April2009), p~ra. 184. 
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3. The implications of these treaty (and customary law) obligations for the 24.06 
maintenance of law and order on military operations has been considered by the 
International Court of Justice in the Congo case. The Court identified a specific 
obligation to 'prevent the recruitment of child soldiers in areas under' the control 
of military forces (the UPDF in that particular case)78 and that in that particular 
case the UN Secretary General reported that 'local UPDF soldiers in and around 
Bunia in Ituri district have failed to prevent the fresh recruitment or re-recruitment 
of children' as child soldiers?9 Armed forces deployed on military operations where 
child soldiers have been recruited and are being used will need to consider what 
measures can be implemented to stop these practices and to assist in bringing those 
responsible for them to account. 
4. There are at least two direct operational consequences that arise from the require-
ment to take all feasible measures to ensure that children do not take a direct part in 
hostilities. First, commanders need to ensure that appropriate directives are issued 
to their subordinates to ensure that children who may be considered to be taking 
a direct part in hostilities, or have taken a direct part in hostilities, are treated in 
accordance with general principles of international law such as, for example, 'the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration'.80 Second, commanders 
must have appropriate mechanisms in place to ensure that any child soldiers that 
they have in their control are handed over to appropriate international or national 
authorities. Thus commanders will need to ensure that there are appropriate modal-
ities in place to facilitate the efficient handover of child soldiers to authorities that 
are able to protect the fundamental rights of such children. 
78 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
(Judgment), ICJ Reports 2005, 168, 241. 79 Ibid. 
80 Art. 3 Convention on the Rights of the Child of20 November 1989. 
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